Introduction
After middle age, further aging is associated with lower levels of many cognitive abilities. Some forms of memory, for example, are lower in older people (Rohwedder and Willis, 2010) . More general measures of intelligence also tend to be lower in people beyond middle age (McCardle et al., 2002) . These reduced levels of skill could have important economic consequences for older people if they infiuence spending, saving, insurance, or health choices. Consistent with this view, economists have found a negative relationship between age and several measures of economic decision-making ability. See, e.g., Willis (2007) Our own research with Syngjoo Choi and Wieland Müller (Choi et al., 2014) reveals, in particular, a substantial negative relationship between age and the consistency of choices with economic rationality. The results of that study show that, in a simple economic choice experiment, people over age 55 have significantly lower levels of rationality than younger people. Specifically, older people's choices are much more likely to violate transitivity; in a simple economic environment they more often reveal a strict preference for good x over good y and also a preference for good y over good x.
Classical economic theory implies that choices that violate transitivity in this way are inconsistent with any stable objective. Because choices that violate this standard of rationality are inconsistent with any fixed goal, our approach treats them as lower quality than rational choices. This view is supported by more than normative theories of choice. We interpret rationality in the experiment as a measure of decision-making ability in part because Choi et al. (2014) also finds a large, statistically significant correlation between rationality and wealth that is robust to conditioning on correlates of preferences, constraints, information, and beliefs.
In this paper we investigate sources of the negative relationship between age and financial decision-making ability. We evaluate three hypotheses:
1. The negative relationship is not due to an underlying relationship between age and rationality, but is instead a cohort effect. Given the many changes in technology, the tasks required of people in economic experiments, especially those implemented through web-based surveys, are relatively unfamiliar to those born before widespread use of computers and the Internet. Upon reaching their mid-fifties, however, younger cohorts will not face the same diffi culty and will appear just as rational as they did in their youth.
2. The correlation between age and rationality results from normal aging processes and can be accounted for by declines in other cognitive functions. In this view, age leads to a reduction in economic decisionmaking ability but this particular form of cognitive decline is not meaningfully distinct from other manifestations of it. In this view, the correlation in Choi et al. (2014) is indicative of a more fundamental cognitive decline well-captured by standard measures of cognitive ability.
3. The average decline in financial decision-making ability with age is driven by those who have had important health problems, independent of losses in other cognitive functions. This theory of the negative correlation between rationality and age sees the decline in rationality not as an unavoidable consequence of age but as the result of illnesses and conditions that disproportionately affect older people.
The quantitative importance of each of these sources of the relationship between age and financial decision-making ability has implications for policy and research. If older people make lower quality decisions because they face unfamiliar economic environments, there is potential for them to learn and adapt, and to benefit from financial education. If the relationship is driven by cognitive decline associated with normal aging, and is not a separate phenomenon from other forms of cognitive decline with age, then there is no need to make special accommodation for older people in financial markets, and finance-related government policies. If instead there is something special about financial decision making ability in older ages, policy-makers and market participants should focus resources on assuring older people have the same effective opportunities as younger populations. Finally, if sharp declines in health drive the relationship between financial decision making quality and age, then accommodations for older populations can be better targeted at those in poor health and the consequences of health care for well-being would further underscored.
To assess the relative importance of these three sources of lower decisionmaking ability among older people, we analyze a replication and extension of the experiment in Choi et al. (2014) , implemented with a sample about whose health and cognitive function we know much more. Specifically, we study an experiment with more than 4,000 members of the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel, a representative sample of over 5,000 Dutch households.
Like the previous experiment, the new experiment presented each subject with 25 problems. Each problem is to choose, from a budget line, an allocation of points between accounts x and y. The subject's payoff from a choice is the points he allocated to one of the accounts, x or y, determined at random and equally likely. After completing 25 problems, one problem is selected at random to be paid. Payments are modest; on average a participant would earn €30 in addition to their normal participation payment.
Different from the survey used in Choi et al. (2014) , however, the LISS contains relatively detailed health information. This information, includes self-reported health, and more objective measures ability at activities of daily living. To this we added questions that ask respondents to implement particular (target) allocations from budget sets. These questions are intended to test a respondent's ability to use a computer to navigate this choice environment. We also added classic tests of cognitive ability, Raven's Matrices. These tests ask subjects to identify, from a list, the missing piece of a patterned geometric object. Success requires subjects to identify the pattern and the geometry of the object to see what is missing.
The main results are as follows:
1. The LISS data reveal, after late middle age, an economically substantial and statistically significant negative correlation between age and measures of economic rationality in the experiment. After conditioning on several socio-demographic characteristics, rationality scores are significantly lower for those age 63 and older.
2. There is no evidence that the negative relationship between age and economic rationality in the experiment is attributable to a cohort effect. Conditioning on the ability of participants to implement a particular choice using the experimental interface does not alter the negative correlation between rationality and age. Older people are more likely to have trouble with the interface in this way, but this ability is not strongly correlated with violations of transitivity in the experiment.
3. There is also no strong evidence that the correlation between age an economic rationality is the inevitable result of normal aging and its associated cognitive declines. Performance on the Raven's matrices task is lower among older people in the sample, but conditioning on this measure of cognitive ability does not much alter the negative correlation between rationality and age. Thus, the lower levels of economic decisionmaking ability among older people appears to be a distinct phenomenon from general cognitive decline.
4. There is no evidence that health is an important driver of the negative relationship between age and economic rationality. Older people who self-report worse health, are at an unhealthy weight, or report more diffi culties with activities of daily living do not have lower decisionmaking abilities in the experiment.
The results of the study thus support the idea that age leads to declines in economic decisionmaking ability that are distinct from other forms of cognitive decline and are not primarily a consequence of declining health more generally.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the experiment in greater detail and explain how we measure economic rationality in the experiment and why we interpret it as a measure of decisionmaking making quality. In Section 3 we discuss the panel data and experimental setting. Section 4 presents the basic results, demonstrating a correlation in these new data between age and economic rationality. Section 5 presents the results of the investigation of what drives the correlation, and Section 6 offers preliminary conclusions.
The Experiment
The experiment studied here was fielded with 4,184 participants in the LISS panel in the spring of 2014. It presented each participant with 25 problems. Each problem asks the participant to make a decision under uncertainty. A natural interpretation of a problem is that there are states of nature denoted by s = 1, 2 and two associated securities, each of which promises a payoff in one state and nothing in the other. The problem is to allocate an endowment of money between the two securities. In each problem the states are equally likely. Let x s denote the demand for the security that pays off in state s and let p s denote its price. If we normalize the individual's wealth to 1, then the budget set is p 1 x 1 + p 2 x 2 = 1 and the individual can choose any portfolio (x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0 that satisfies this constraint.
Each decision problem started with the computer selecting a budget line randomly from the set of budget lines that intersect with at least one of the axes at 50 or more points, but with no intercept exceeding 100 points. The participant's task is to use the computer's mouse or trackpad to point and click on his or her preferred portfolio. The initial location of the computer's cursor was also selected at random from a uniform distribution over the budget line. See Figure 1 for an illustration of the interface that participants faced.
During the course of the experiment, subjects were not provided information about the account that had been selected in each round. At the end of the experiment, the computer selected one round for each subject, where each round had an equal probability of being chosen, and the subject was paid the amount he had earned in that round. Payoffs were calculated in terms of points and then converted into euros. As noted in the introduction, payments were modest; on average a participant would earn €30 in addition to their normal participation payment. Participants received their payment from the LISS reimbursement system via direct deposit into a bank account.
Testing Rationality
Following Afriat's (1967) theorem, we employ the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) to test whether the set of observed price and quantity data that our experiment generated for each participant may be rationalized by a utility function. 1 The large range of budget sets faced by each participant provides a rigorous test of GARP. In particular, the changes in endowments and prices are such that budget lines cross frequently. This means that the data lead to high power tests of revealed preference conditions. See the Appendix for an evaluation of the test's power.
To assess how nearly the data complies with GARP, we calculate both Afriat's (1972) Critical Cost Effi ciency Index (CCEI) and the Money Pump Index (MPI) due to Echenique et al. (2011) . The CCEI measures the fraction by which each budget constraint must be shifted in order to remove all violations of GARP. By definition, the CCEI is between 0 and 1: indices closer to 1 mean the data are closer to perfect consistency with GARP and hence to perfect consistency with utility maximization. See the Appendix, Figure A1 , for an illustration.
Echenique et al.'s (2011) MPI is related to the CCEI and is based on the classic idea that violations of GARP can be exploited as a "money pump." The measure calculates the average or median gains available to an "arbitrageur" who could purchase a bundle that the individual declined at lower relative prices and profitably trade that bundle for another that the individual revealed he would prefer at higher relative prices. See the Appendix for a more formal discussion.
Interpreting Rationality as Decisionmaking Quality
Traditional economic analysis assumes that all choices are rational. In this standard view, heterogeneity in choices is attributed to heterogeneity in preferences, information, beliefs, or constraints. As noted in the introduction, a relatively recent empirical literature considers heterogeneity in choices driven, instead, by differences in the quality of decision-making. 2 In this view, there are potentially important wedges between the choices that some people actually make and the choices they would make if they had more skills or time. Indeed, in many cases, the empirical evidence strongly suggests differences in the quality of decision-making. Typically, however, definitive judgment about decision-making quality is made diffi cult by twin problems of identification and measurement.
The identification problem is to distinguish differences in decisionmaking quality from unobserved differences in preferences, information, beliefs or constraints. This is important because distinguishing decisionmaking quality from other sources of heterogeneity in choices is critical for policy design. Positive predictions, welfare conclusions and thus (constrained) optimal policy depend critically on the sources of any systematic differences in choices. The measurement problem is to define and implement a portable, practical, autonomous, quantifiable, and economically interpretable measure of decision-making quality.
Here we define aspects of decisionmaking quality by the compliance of choices with economic rationality. More specifically, we call choices high quality if there exists a well-defined (utility) function that the choices maximize (and choices are consistent with maximizing a utility function if and only if they satisfy GARP). We view this approach as complementing those based on one of the many tests of cognitive ability (IQ). That said, consistency with GARP offers a theoretically disciplined metric for quality of economic decisions. The measure has a well-established economic interpretation that permits, among other things, the disentangling of quality from preferences. And, classical theory tells us whether we have enough data to make it statistically useful. There is no comparable, theoretically disciplined, means using, interpreting, and evaluating an IQ test. Another advantage of the GARP test over IQ tests is that the former is easily portable to a variety of choice problems. We can thus make domain-specific predictions and study a comparable measure of decision-making quality across domains.
The LISS Data
The LISS is administered by CentERdata is a research institute in the Tilburg School of Economics and Management (TiSEM) in the Netherlands. CentERdata specializes in online surveys and manages several panels, each consisting of more than 2,000 households, that are representative of the Dutch-speaking population in the Netherlands. Via the Internet, CentERdata (www.centerdata.nl) can implement sophisticated experiments and collects a great deal of individual demographic and economic information from its panels.
The experiment described here was conducted with 4,160 members of the LISS panel about whom basic demographic information is non-missing. Summary statistics of this analysis sample are provided in Table 1 . The average age of the sample is about 48 years with 22% age 64 and older. The sample also includes a large fraction of younger people, with 12% ages 16 to 23. Females represent a larger proportion (53%) than males. Approximately half the sample is currently employed, while 18% is retired and 12% is still in school. About 50% of the sample left school after the equivalent of an advanced high school (either academic or vocational) and just 10% has a university degree. The remainder of the sample finished some form of higher education, either academic or vocational. Personal income varies widely in the sample with a median monthly income of about €1,800 but a mean of €3,092. The top 5% of the sample has income in excess of 5,000.
Decisionmaking Quality: Differences by Age
Statistics of decisionmaking quality, as measured by consistency with GARP in the experiment, are presented in Tables 2a and 2b . The mean level of the CCEI score is 0.87 and the median is 0.91. The MPI score, which is also on a scale of 0 to 1 has a mean of 0.88 and a median of 0.96. Regardless of the measure, at least a quarter of the sample's choices are, in effect, perfectly consistent with GARP. This level of decisionmaking quality is similar to what was observed in the CentERpanel (Choi et al., 2014) where the average CCEI score was 0.88, the median was 0.93 and, again, at least 25% were perfectly consistent with GARP.
Our focus is on any differences in decisionmaking quality by age. Tables  2a and 2b presents simple averages by age. Table 3 presents the results of a regressions of decisionmaking quality on age and several other socioeconomic characteristics. While a comparison of simple means (Tables 2a,  2b, or columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 ) indicates only modest differences in decisionmaking quality by age. After conditioning on gender, education, family structure, employment status, and income, however, more significant differences emerge. 3 In particular, consistency with GARP is significantly lower among those age 64 and older than among younger members of the sample. Using the CCEI scores as the measure of economic rationality, the conditional measures are lower by 0.038 to 0.025, or between 27% to 18% of a standard deviation for the entire sample. When we use the MPI as the measure of rationality, the relationship with age is similar in magnitude, though the estimates are more precise. Based on the MPI, the scores of those older than 64 are 0.050 to 0.034 points lower, representing between 30% to 20% of a standard deviation for the entire sample.
These conditional correlations between age and economic rationality in the experiment are qualitatively similar to those in Choi et al. (2014) . In that study, OLS estimates of the conditional correlation between age and the CCEI indicate that those older than 64 had scores 0.051 points lower than younger participants. Different from the findings in the LISS, the Choi et al (2014) findings indicate that the lower rationality scores start among people as young as the mid 50s.
Sources of Lower Decisionmaking Quality at Older Ages
The preceding analysis shows that older people reveal significantly lower levels of economic rationality in the experiment, conditional on several observable characteristics. In what follows, we explore alternative explanations for the lower rationality scores of older people.
A Cohort Effect
One reason older people may exhibit lower rationality in the experiment is because the task requires facility with a computer interface that is relatively unfamiliar to those born before widespread use of computers and the Internet. If so, there is little reason for concern that economic rationality declines importantly in old age. Instead, the results described above would refiect a more general problem of adaptation to new technologies. Moreover, we would expect that, upon reaching their mid-sixties, younger cohorts will appear just as rational (on this task) as they did in their youth.
While this is a logical hypothesis, there are reasons to be skeptical that this is a driving force behind the relationship between age and rationality in the experiment. First, there many other sources of evidence that economic decisionmaking quality is lower among older people (e.g., Agarwal et al, 2009) that do not rely on computerized elicitation methods. Second, members of the LISS panel have been working with computer interfaces, as part of the survey, for months. Thus, even if older people generally have less facility with computers, this particular group should be relatively able.
Nevertheless, it is useful to explore to what extent struggles with the interface can explain the relationship between economic rationality in the experiment and age. We therefore added one problem at the end of the sequence of 25 which simply asked participants to choose an allocation that paid 20 points to the x account. Participants were told that of they performed this task correctly (with a 1-point margin for error), they would receive €0.50.
Just 61% of the analysis sample chose to complete the task. Of these, 84% performed the task correctly. Among those who missed the target by more than one point, the average amount by which they missed was 20 points.
The tendency to miss the target is strongly correlated with age. Those younger than 23 miss the target 11% of the time while those age 51 to 63 miss it, on average, about 18% of the time. Those older than 72 missed the target 26% of the time. As shown in Table 2 , however, this greater tendency of older people to miss the target does not, however, explain their higher rates of inconsistency in the experiment.
For reference, the first two columns of Table 4 present the OLS estimates of the relationship between age and economic rationality (CCEI and MPI, respectively) in the experiment, conditional on a number of sociodemographic characteristics. This is just a reproduction of columns 2 and 4 from Table 3. As described above, the results indicate that those older than 64 have exhibit lower levels of economic rationality. Columns 3 and 4 replicate these estimates for the those (2,374) in the analysis sample that also completed the target task. The coeffi cients on the dummies for age 64 to 71 and age over 72 are qualitatively unchanged in this subsample. Given the smaller sample size, however, the standard errors associated with these estimates increase, and p-values rise a bit.
Columns 5 and 6 present the specifications of interest. Here we add both an indicator for whether the participant missed the target, and and a measure of the amount (in points) by which he or she missed the target. Column 5 presents the results for the CCEI and Column 6 for the MPI. There is some modest evidence that the amount by which participants missed the target is related to their level of rationality in the choice task. But in neither of these specifications does conditioning on the ability of participants to implement a particular choice using the experimental interface substantially alter the negative correlation between rationality and age.
These findings indicate that while older people are more likely to have trouble with the interface as evidenced by an inability to (or lack of willingness to) implement at particular allocation, this ability is not strongly correlated with violations of transitivity in the experiment. Thus, to the extent that diffi culties with the experimental task interfered with implementation of preferred bundles, it was not evident in violations of GARP and it does not explain the lower levels of consistency among older people.
The Consequences of Normal Aging
An alternative source of the correlation between age and rationality is the cognitive decline associated with normal aging. In this view, age reduces in economic decisionmaking ability because age causes declines in cognitive abilities that infiuence economic choices. If so, then measures of cognitive ability should help explain the negative relationship between economic rationality and age.
To evaluate this hypothesis we asked participants to complete a 20-element Ravens' Matrix task. Each element of the task ask subjects to identify, from a list, the missing piece of a patterned geometric object. Success requires subjects to identify the pattern and the geometry of the object to see what is missing. The task is a classic test of intelligence and have been used by social scientists for decades. An important advantage of the test is that it does not require literacy, but just an understanding of what it means to "solve" each puzzle.
Again, not all of the analysis sample performed the task. In this case, just 44% (1,810) completed the 20 questions. As expected, however, older people perform substantially worse on this task. Those younger than 23 solved an average of 10.7 matrices correctly. People age 51 to 63 solved 8.7, while those ages 64 and older solved an average of just 6.8 matrices correctly. Given the sharp difference in cognitive ability by age, there is good reason to think that the Ravens'test score can explain an important amount of the correlation between age and economic rationality in the experiment. Table 5 shows, however, that this is not the case. For reference, the first two columns of Table 5 replicate the basic specification of Table 3 (columns 2 and 4). Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 repeat these specifications but restrict attention to those who completed the Raven's matrices task. The coeffi cients on the older ages are smaller in this population, but still negative. Conditioning on the Raven's score (in columns 5 and 6) leaves the coeffi cient on the older age indicators virtually unchanged, however. The Raven's test score is positively correlated with rationality in the experiment, but not strongly so. Thus, we find no evidence that cognitive declines associated with normal aging are driving the negative relationship between economic rationality and age.
The Result of Declining Health
Finally, we consider the possibility that the lower average levels of economic rationality among older people is largely attributable to those who have had important health problems. This source of the negative correlation between rationality and age sees illnesses and conditions that disproportionately affect older people as the underlying cause of their lower decisionmaking quality.
To assess this possibility, we restrict attention to the 2,933 participants of the analysis sample about whom detailed health information is also nonmissing. For reference, Table 6 , columns 1 and 2 reproduce the results of the baseline specification for the entire analysis sample. Columns 3 and 4 then replicate our basic specification for this subsample. The coeffi cients on the indicators for older ages are very similar to those for the entire sample.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 add to the basic specification a rich set of controls for health. These include indicators for self-reported health being poor or good (relative to very good or excellent), the number of activities of daily living and instrumental activities of daily living with which the participant reports important diffi culty, an indicator for having a chronic ailment or disability, and a self-reported measure of body mass index (BMI). Many of these measures of health have the expected sign in the regression (results available upon request), but their inclusion has virtually no effect on the age coeffi cients. Even conditional on health, older people exhibit lower levels of consistency with economic rationality in the experiment.
Conclusion
Social science has documented that older people have lower levels of several cognitive skills. Some of these skills are likely important for making sound spending, saving, insurance, or health choices. Indeed, our prior work (Choi et al, 2014) showed that older people exhibit lower levels of economic rationality in a simple, incentivized choice experiment. In this way, we found evidence that older people are less able (or willing) to make choices consistent with any stable objective.
In this paper, we used a new dataset to investigate the sources of the correlation between age and economic rationality. In the new data, we replicate the qualitative relationship observed in the previous work. Older people have lower levels of economic rationality and these differences are both statistically and economically significant.
The findings suggest that the decline in economic rationality with age is a true age effect, not a cohort effect. We find no evidence that the lower levels of decisionmaking quality among older people are due to their disproportionate diffi culties with the computer interface used in the experiment. In this way, the findings indicate that the relatively lower levels of decisionmaking quality among older people should be expected to persist.
Similarly, we find no evidence that the decline in economic rationality in the experiment is explained by more general forms of cognitive decline. Thus, the findings indicate that the lower decisionmaking quality among older people is not a simple consequence of declines in general forms of cognitive ability. Finally, we find no evidence that the lower average levels of cognitive ability in older people is concentrated among those who have experienced important declines in physical health. Certainly older people are in worse health, but we find no evidence that this explains why they exhibit lower levels of rationality in the experiment.
Taken together the results indicate that economic decisionmaking quality declines with normal aging and this is distinct phenomenon form other forms of cognitive decline with age. The evidence thus suggests that there is something distinct about financial decision making ability that declines in older ages. If older people make different choices from younger ones or from what a normative theory would suggest, it follows that additional scrutiny is justified. The evidence presented here suggests it is less likely to be ex-13 clusively a matter of special tastes among the elderly. Instead, the results presented here suggest analysts should give more credence to the possibility that diminished capacities to understand and make effective economic tradeoffs are infiuencing choices in older population. It follows that policymakers and market participants that are concerned with the welfare of older people should focus more attention on assuring that products and markets are designed to that the elderly have same effective opportunities as younger populations. OLS esttimates with the omitted age category being those from 16-23. Soc ioeconomic controls include indicators for gender, employment statuses, and completed education levels, as well as levels of individua l income and the number of children in the household. Columns 5 and 6 inc lude controls for whether, in a separate round, the participant failed to choose a specific target bundle and, if so, by how many points did she miss the target. Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, respectively. OLS esttimates with the omitted age category being those from 16-23. Soc io•economic controls inc lude indicators for gender, employment statuses, and completed education leve ls, as well as levels of individual income and the number of children in the household. Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, respectively. OLS esttimates with the omitted age category being those from 16-23. Health controls inc lude indicators for poor and good self•reported health (very good or excellent health category omitted), and for having a chronic ailment. Health controls also inc lude the number of (i)adls with which the respondent has difficulty and a measure of body mass index. Socio•economic controls inc lude indicators for gender, employment statuses, and completed education leve ls, as well as levels of individua l income and the number of children in the household. Standard errors, robust to heteroskedasticity, are in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate 10, 5, 1 percent significance levels, respectively. 
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